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A distinction is proposed between recommending for preferred choice options and recommending against non-
preferred choice options. In binary choice, both recommendation modes are logically, though not psychologically,
equivalent. We report empirical evidence showing that speakers recommending for preferred options predominantly
select positive frames, which are less common when speakers recommend against non-preferred options. In addition,
option attractiveness is shown to affect speakers’ choice of frame, and adoption of recommendation mode. The results
are interpreted in terms of three compatibility effects, (i) recommendation mode—valence framing compatibility: speak-
ers’ preference for positive framing is enhanced under recommending for and diminished under recommending against
instructions, (ii) option attractiveness—valence framing compatibility: speakers’ preference for positive framing is more
pronounced for attractive than for unattractive options, and (iii) recommendation mode—option attractiveness compati-
bility: speakers are more likely to adopt a recommending for approach for attractive than for unattractive binary choice
pairs.
Keywords: framing; positivity bias; recommendation mode; valence.
1 Introduction
Framing effects have been much debated ever since Tver-
sky and Kahneman (1981) showed that preference for risk
is dependent on choice alternatives being framed either
in positive or negative terms. Evidently, choice behavior
is determined not only by the inherent value of the al-
ternative options, but also by the way in which they are
described.
Early framing studies exposed participants to vignettes
that contained text fragments and recorded decision mak-
ers’ corresponding choices. Little attention was paid in
these studies to the source of the message. In reality,
however, a message is transferred from a source (e.g., a
speaker) to a target (e.g., a listener). Indeed, an analysis
of the speakers’ and the listeners’ perspective is central to
the conversational analysis of human judgment (Schwarz,
1996) and constitutes the essence of Grice’s logic of con-
versation and relevance theory. The social context of de-
cision making is therefore crucial when studying framing.
An understanding of the pragmatics of framing re-
quires not only the study of decision makers’ responses
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to alternative frames, but also an examination of speak-
ers’ construction and preference among various possi-
ble frames. The present paper constitutes a continuation
of our previous research (Van Buiten & Keren, 2009)
in which, employing a conversational framework, the
persuasive efficacy of speakers and listeners was exam-
ined. Specifically, in previous research we analyzed risky
choice framing (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998), and
have shown that speakers who try to persuade a listener
to adopt a particular choice alternative possess a distinct
preference for positive over negative framing. Judged
from listeners’ responses, however, the inclination to use
positive frames is effective for promoting riskless, but not
risky options. We demonstrated empirically that the in-
compatibility between speakers and listeners was due to
an asymmetry in evaluation mode (Hsee, Loewenstein,
Blount, & Bazerman, 1999) between speakers and lis-
teners. Speakers can jointly (i.e., comparatively) assess
the information and the persuasive qualities of alternative
frames. In contrast, listeners are exposed only to one of
these frames and, consequently, can assess the informa-
tion only separately (i.e., non-comparatively).
In our earlier research we studied frame valence (pos-
itive vs. negative) preferences of speakers’ and their ef-
fectiveness in persuading listeners. Specifically, we ex-
amined the compatibility between speakers and listen-
ers in terms of frame preferences. In the present study
we explore a closely related issue to valence framing,
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namely the manner by which an option is recommended.
A distinction is proposed between two general persua-
sive orientations that speakers might adopt: “recommend-
ing for preferred choice alternatives” and “recommend-
ing against non-preferred choice alternatives.”1 This dis-
tinction is referred to as recommendation mode. Broadly
speaking, recommending for entail drawing attention to
(and listing of) desired attributes thus forming a positive
orientation. In contrast, recommending against requires
attending to unwanted aspects thus forming a negative
orientation. Note that in the present context, positive and
negative orientations should be interpreted not just in ab-
solute but also in relative terms. Thus, for example, say-
ing that “item A is cheaper than item B” implies a (pos-
itive) recommendation for A. Similarly, “item B is more
expensive than A” implies a (negative) recommendation
against B.
1.1 Recommendation mode: Recommend
for vs. recommend against
Our main interest is to examine the effect of recommen-
dation mode on speakers’ selection of frame, and how
it affects the persuasive efficacy of speakers. For lis-
teners (i.e., decision makers), a closely related distinc-
tion is between accepting preferred and rejecting non-
preferred choice alternatives. Shafir (1993) studied the
accept-reject distinction in binary choice. Specifically,
choice sets were employed that contained “enriched op-
tions” characterized by some very positive and some very
negative attribute values, and “impoverished options”
which merely included moderately positive and negative
attribute values. He found that, even when both options in
enriched-impoverished pairs were approximately equally
attractive, the enriched option was likely to be accepted
as well as rejected more frequently than the impover-
ished option. Shafir proposed a compatibility explana-
tion following which positive attribute values weigh more
in accept mode, whereas negative attribute values receive
more weight in reject mode. That is, the enriched op-
tion suggests a more persuasive rationale for both accept-
ing as rejecting it, yielding non-complementary, super-
additive “accept“ and “reject” proportions. This view has
been challenged in subsequent research. Moreover, re-
lated research has extended the accept-reject distinction
to the more general processes of inclusion and exclusion
of items. For example, Heller, Levin, and Goransson
1Whereas “against” in “recommending against non-preferred choice
alternatives” is crucial to its meaning, in everyday discourse one would
probably drop “for” in “recommending for preferred choice alterna-
tives”. There is thus an asymmetry in the English terminology. How-
ever, in other languages such as Norwegian, or Dutch (the language
used in the experiments reported in this paper), the terminology is sym-
metrical. For example, the Dutch translations of “recommend for” and
“recommend against” are “aanraden” and “afraden.”
(2002) have shown that producing a shortlist of choice al-
ternatives by eliminating prospects from an initial set of
possible prospects (rejection or exclusion) is psycholog-
ically distinct from generating the shortlist from scratch
(acceptance or inclusion), yielding different outcomes in
terms of the size and composition of the resulting choice
set. In particular, the choice set is typically larger when a
rejection strategy is used.2
Inspired by the above research, the present paper pri-
marily focuses on the effect of recommendation mode on
speakers’ frame selection, in particular in binary choice.
Admittedly, decision and recommendation mode are dif-
ferent in many ways. Specifically, recommendation oc-
curs prior to decision and entails less commitment. De-
spite the differences, there are also important similarities.
In particular, in binary choice, recommendation mode can
be viewed as a natural complement of decision mode.
Just as decision makers can be oriented either towards
the preferred (in accept mode) or non-preferred (in reject
mode) option, speakers’ verbal expressions too can be ei-
ther aimed at the preferred (in recommend for mode) or
the non-preferred (in recommend against mode) option.
In choice situations with more than two choice op-
tions, the recommend or accept mode, from the speaker’s
and listener’s view, respectively, may be considered su-
perior in terms of their efficiency. It is more efficient
to select or recommend a preferred option from a large
set of choice options than it is to explicitly reject or rec-
ommend against all others. In binary choice, which is
examined in the present paper, there is no apparent dif-
ference in efficiency, and recommendation modes (and,
decision modes) are logically equivalent. Notwithstand-
ing, recommending for a preferred choice alternative or
recommending against a non-preferred one are orienta-
tions that, although logically equivalent, might not be so
psychologically.
Recent framing research illustrates how slight changes
in verbal expressions have different conversational im-
plicatures and can thus contain different implicit recom-
mendations. For example, Teigen and Brun (1999) have
shown that different verbal expressions of uncertainty
that are judged to reflect the same numerical probability,
i.e., “some possibility” and “quite uncertain,” nonetheless
affect the degree to which a target behavior appears to be
2Yaniv, Schul, Raphaelli-Hirsch, and Maoz (2002) discussed a dual-
criterion model that links the non-complementarity of inclusive and ex-
clusive modes of thinking to a justification process. The inclusion mode
induces a person to justify why an option eligible for inclusion should
be admitted in the set. In contrast, the exclusion mode induces a per-
son to justify why an option eligible for exclusion should be removed
from the set. This may lead to non-complementarity, because “in the
inclusive mode, the absence of clear justification may be sufficient for
the decision not to include an option in the choice set, while in the ex-
clusive mode, the mere absence of clear justification for including an
option may not be sufficient to exclude it” (Yaniv et al., 2002, pp. 353–
354).
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recommended. For instance, when a treatment (T) for
migraine headaches was presented as having some possi-
bility to be helpful, it was thought to express an implicit
recommendation of T and correspondingly induced a rel-
atively high willingness to recommend T, whereas claim-
ing it to be quite uncertain to be helpful led to a lower
willingness to recommend T.
Recommendation mode was indirectly addressed in the
second and third experiments of a recent paper on one-
sided uncertainty intervals (Teigen, Halberg, & Foster-
vold, 2007). They show that a price of a product ex-
pressed in lower limit terms (e.g., “these shoes cost more
than X”) is judged by listeners as a discouragement to
buy, whereas expressed in upper limit terms (e.g., “these
shoes cost less than Y”) is perceived to be an encour-
agement to buy. Speakers, correspondingly, used a lower
limit statement when asked to discourage, and an upper
limit statement when asked to encourage.
The work of Teigen et al. (2007) centered on the lis-
tener’s perspective. In contrast, the present paper sys-
tematically addresses speakers’ frame selection employ-
ing logically equivalent positive and negative frames. In
our previous work (Van Buiten & Keren, 2009) we have
demonstrated a “positivity bias” in framing, namely the
finding that, other things being equal, speakers generally
prefer positive to negative frames.3 Our goal here is to
further examine how speakers’ preference for the positive
frame is related to recommendation mode, and option at-
tractiveness.
Experiments 1 through 3 were designed to explore, un-
der different conditions, which frames speakers consider
to be most persuasive. Two determinants of speakers’
frame selection were examined, namely the aforemen-
tioned recommendation mode, and option attractiveness.
Option attractiveness was considered a natural and poten-
tially important factor, because of the notion of compat-
ibility effects that plays a large role in research on the
accept-reject distinction (e.g., Shafir, 1993). By exten-
sion, it was deemed important also for the present re-
search on the related recommendation mode distinction.
Option attractiveness is considered both as a direct deter-
minant of frame selection, and as an indirect influence
through its effect on the adoption of recommendation
mode, which in turns influences speakers’ frame selec-
tion. The final experiment also includes listeners’ evalua-
tions to assess the extent to which speakers’ frame selec-
tion is indeed effective.
Consistent with our earlier research, in which the per-
suasive goal was implemented in terms of recommending
for the preferred option, Experiments 1 and 2 show that
3The so called positivity bias is prevalent in different contexts and in
different guises. For instance, most marketing communication attempts
to influence consumers by presenting positive features of the product (or
brand) or link it with positive associations (Crowley & Hoyer, 1994).
speakers have an overall preference for positive framing
(i.e., positivity bias), which is mitigated by the compat-
ibility principle. Speakers employing a recommending
against strategy are less likely to use positive framing
because of incompatibility between the (negatively per-
ceived) strategy and positive frames. Moreover, fram-
ing behavior is affected by option attractiveness, depend-
ing on whether choice options are highly attractive or
unattractive. Positive frames are less likely to be em-
ployed when options are very unattractive. Experiment
3 demonstrates the effect of option attractiveness on the
adoption of recommendation mode. While speakers pre-
dominantly adopt a recommend for strategy, fewer speak-
ers adopt this strategy and instead are more likely to
employ a recommend against strategy when options are
unattractive than when options are attractive. Finally,
Experiment 4 illustrates that speakers’ recommendation
mode can indeed affect their persuasive efficacy.
2 Experiment 1
Part of the appeal of positive frames seems to be derived
from the opportunity that speakers usually have to com-
pare it to the logically equivalent negative frame (joint
evaluation mode). When speakers are provided with both
framing possibilities, there seems to be a cultural predis-
position towards positive formulations.
In the present experiment, speakers were placed in the
default situation of joint evaluation. We predicted recom-
mendation mode to affect frame selection through two,
partly counteracting, principles. First, based on the pre-
viously identified positivity bias, we expected that, other
things being equal, speakers would reveal a preference
for positive framing. Second, based on the compatibil-
ity principle, we further hypothesized that the positive
frame would lose some of its appeal when speakers are
geared towards the negative recommendation mode, i.e.,
recommending against a non-preferred alternative. Con-
sequently, speakers in both recommendation modes were
predicted to frame positively, but the effect was expected
to attenuate in the recommend against mode, due to in-
compatibility between frame and recommendation mode.
2.1 Method
Participants: One hundred thirty-five students from Rad-
boud University of Nijmegen participated in the exper-
iment. The experiment was part of a set of unrelated
decision-making tasks that took about 25 minutes to com-
plete. Participants received C 5 for their participation.
Design and procedure: Participants read a scenario
about a friend who was looking for a used car. Specif-
ically, this person considered two cars that differed in
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terms of driving performance, and fuel consumption.
These features were expressed on an 11-point scale rang-
ing from –5 (very poor) to +5 (very good).
Approximately half the participants were then pre-
sented with a table displaying two relatively good (attrac-
tive) cars. Car A scored +3 on driving performance and
+1 on fuel consumption. Scores were reversed for car B,
i.e., this car scored +1 on driving performance, and +3 on
fuel consumption. Additional information accompanying
the table pointed out that, due to the friend’s limited bud-
get, the cars were not brand new, but did not have serious
defects because the scores on driving performance and
fuel consumption were positive for both cars.
The other half of the participants received a table dis-
playing two relatively poor (unattractive) cars. Car A
scored –1 on driving performance and –3 on fuel con-
sumption. Scores were reversed for car B, i.e., this car
scored –3 on driving performance, and –1 on fuel con-
sumption. Additional information accompanying the ta-
ble pointed out that, due to the friend’s limited budget,
the cars were not brand new, and had some minor defects
because the scores on driving performance and fuel con-
sumption were negative for both cars.
All participants were instructed to imagine having a
strong preference for car A, thus wanting to convince
their friend of this car’s superiority. They were assigned
the role of speaker by imposing one of two recommenda-
tion modes. Participants in the recommend for condition
were required to recommend car A as strong as possible.
They were presented with two statements, one containing
a positive and one containing a negative formulation, and
had to indicate which they would use (i.e., which state-
ment they thought was most persuasive):
“I recommend choosing car A. After all, car
A is better than car B on driving performance”
(positive frame), or
“I recommend choosing car A. After all, car B
is worse than car A on driving performance”
(negative frame)
Participants in the recommend against condition were
required to recommend against car B as strong as pos-
sible. They also had to indicate which statement they
would use (i.e., which statement they deemed most per-
suasive):
“I recommend against choosing car B. After all,
car A is better than car B on driving perfor-
mance” (positive frame), or
“I recommend against choosing car B. After all,
car B is worse than car A on driving perfor-
mance” (negative frame)
In sum, the experiment constituted a 2 (recommend for
vs. recommend against mode) x 2 (attractive vs. unattrac-
tive options) between-subjects design. The dependent
variable was the selection of frame (positive vs. negative).
The order in which frames were presented on the screen
was counterbalanced. No order effects were found.
2.2 Results and discussion
The results are portrayed in Table 1 (panel A). Consistent
with our hypothesis, the majority of the participants (89
out of 135, or 66%) chose the positive frame (p < .001 as
judged by a binomial test). More important, as revealed
by a logistic regression analysis, the tendency to frame
positively was strongest with recommend for instructions
(53 out of 69, or 77%), and was reliably reduced (exp(B)
= .20, SE = .57, p < .01) for recommend against instruc-
tions (36 out of 66, or 55%).
The attractiveness of the cars did not reliably affect
framing behavior (exp(B) = .61, SE = .50, p = .32),
nor did attractiveness reliably interact with recommen-
dation mode (exp(B) = 3.10, SE = .77, p = .15). Speak-
ers were thus not more inclined to use positive frames
for the more attractive options, nor were their responses
greatly divergent in the recommend for-attractive cars and
the recommend against-unattractive cars conditions rel-
ative to the other conditions. The present experiment,
however, employed a scenario with choice options (com-
mon consumer goods) that were either mildly attractive
or unattractive.
A follow-up experiment was designed to explore
boundary conditions, using scenarios with choice options
that were more extremely attractive or unattractive. The
extremely attractive options were incidental lottery win-
nings in which participation in the lottery occurred by de-
fault as part of a signing up package for an online book
club. These options were supposed to yield virtually cost-
less gains. In particular, participants in the attractive op-
tions condition were told that a person named Peter had
won a lottery. Peter, supposedly, had entered the lottery
as part of his subscription to an online book club. His
prize consisted of a stay in a hotel of his choice nearby
a nature reserve. He had the choice between a two night
stay in a 5 star accommodation (Prize X) and a four night
stay in a 3 star accommodation (Prize Y). About half of
the participants were instructed to persuasively recom-
mend the two night stay in the 5 star accommodation
(i.e., Prize X) through the selection of either a positive
(“I recommend choosing Prize X. After all, with Prize X
you gain a stay in a hotel of higher quality than is the
case with Prize Y.”) or a negative (“I recommend choos-
ing Prize X. After all, with Prize Y you only gain a stay
in a hotel of lower quality than is the case with Prize X.”)
frame. The other half of the participants in the attractive
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Table 1: Proportions of participants in Experiment 1 preferring the positive frame as a function of recommendation
mode and attractiveness.
Panel A: Experiment 1
Option attractiveness
Recommendation mode Attractive cars Unattractive cars Total
Recommend for 28/34 (82%) 25/35 (71%) 53/69 (77%)
Recommend against 16/33 (48%) 20/33 (61%) 36/66 (55%)
Total 44/67 (66%) 45/68 (66%) 89/135 (66%)
Panel B: Follow-up experiment
Option attractiveness
Recommendation mode Extremely attractiveoptions (lottery scenario)
Extremely unattractive
options (fine scenario) Total
Recommend for 26/31 (84%) 18/31 (58%) 44/62 (71%)
Recommend against 26/30 (87%) 7/31 (23%) 33/61 (54%)
Total 52/61 (85%) 25/62 (40%) 77/123 (63%)
options condition were instructed to recommend against
the four night stay in the 3 star accommodation (i.e., Prize
Y), also by selecting the frame perceived to be most per-
suasive, i.e., a positive (“I recommend against choosing
Prize Y. After all, with Prize X you gain a stay in a ho-
tel of higher quality than is the case with Prize Y.”) or a
negative (“I recommend against choosing Prize Y. After
all, with Prize Y you only gain a stay in a hotel of lower
quality than is the case with Prize X.”) frame.
The extremely unattractive options were unjustified
fines. They were unjustified in that someone else com-
mitted a traffic violation for which an innocent person
was being punished. These options thus yield a loss with-
out any benefit. In particular, participants in the unattrac-
tive options condition were told that Peter was fined for a
traffic violation which he did not commit. He was fined
for recklessly ignoring a traffic light, thereby endanger-
ing the lives of others. Peter’s many protests turned out
to be fruitless, and he was given the choice between a sus-
pended sentence of 1 day in prison plus a 32 hour course
in appropriate driving (Fine X), and a suspended sentence
of 2 days in prison plus a 4 hour course in appropriate
driving (Fine Y). As with the attractive options, half of
the participants were instructed to persuasively recom-
mend for, while the remaining participant were instructed
to recommend against, using positive and negative frames
that were constructed in the same way as they were for the
attractive options.
It was predicted that, compared with the previous ex-
periment, frame selection would become more unequiv-
ocal positive for extremely attractive options, and sim-
ilarly predominantly negative for extremely unattractive
options. The effect of the intrinsic (positive or negative)
character of the choice options on frame selection was
thought to partly offset the moderating effect of recom-
mendation mode. This should render the positive frame
especially suited for the promotion of extremely attrac-
tive options, and the negative frame for the promotion of
the extremely unattractive options.
The results are depicted in Table 1 (panel B). Consis-
tent with the original experiment, the overall tendency
to frame positively (63%) was strongest with recommend
for instructions (44 out of 62, or 71%), and was reliably
reduced (exp(B) = .21, SE = .56, p < .01) for recommend
against instructions (33 out of 61, or 54%).
Further, as predicted, the extremely attractive options
scenario elicited a higher selection rate of the positive
frame than the extremely unattractive options scenario
(52 out of 61, or 85% vs. 25 out of 62, or 40%; exp(B)
= 3.76, SE = .61, p < .05). Given the very negative nature
of the unattractive options (i.e., jail time), the 40% se-
lection rate of the positive frame can be considered fairly
high, which further illustrates the potency of the positiv-
ity bias in framing.
In addition, option attractiveness asymmetrically af-
fected framing behavior under recommend for and rec-
ommend against instructions. For extremely attractive
options, participants overwhelmingly selected the pos-
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itive frame independent of persuasive orientation (84%
and 87% for recommend for and recommend against in-
structions, respectively).4 For extremely unattractive op-
tions, a minority selected a positive frame under recom-
mend against instructions (23%), but a small majority
still selected the positive frame under recommend for in-
structions (58%). The interaction was statistically reli-
able (exp(B) = 5.93, SE = .92, p < .05).
One important finding emerging from the above exper-
iments is that speakers with a recommend for orientation
exhibit a strong tendency to use positive frames in persua-
sion attempts. This tendency was attenuated for speakers
with a recommend against orientation. One might won-
der whether or not this finding is specific to the kind of
frames used in both experiments. These frames expressed
attribute information of two options comparatively, either
as a relative advantage of one (i.e., “A is better than B”),
or as a relative disadvantage of the other option (i.e., “B is
worse than A”). Attribute information was selectively dis-
played, i.e., the frames contained information about only
one attribute, although more information was available in
the scenario. In particular, two attributes were provided
such that neither one of the two options dominated on
both attributes.
Moreover, the different frames emphasized different
options. Option A was the focal option in the positive
frame (“A is better than B”), whereas option B was the
focal option in the negative frame (“B is worse than A”).
“Recommending A” is thus linguistically more compat-
ible with “A is better than B” (i.e., “I recommend A,
because A is better than B”), whereas “recommending
against B” matches well with “B is worse than A” (i.e.,
“I recommend against B, because B is worse than A”).
Would people still select a positive frame if all the infor-
mation would be framed such that there is no clear em-
phasis on one of the options?
The results from a pilot experiment suggest that they
would. As part of the experiment, participants were asked
to select a frame that would most informatively explain a
decision they made in the accept mode. The frames were
structured as “Although option B has an advantage on at-
tribute 1, option A has an advantage on attribute 2,” or
“Although option A has a disadvantage on attribute 1, op-
tion B has a disadvantage on attribute 2.” These frames
thus displayed information on both attributes either uni-
formly positive or uniformly negative. Across two con-
texts (i.e., rooms and music players), 84% of the partici-
pants selected the uniformly positive frame.
Because the above pilot experiment pertained to deci-
sion makers trying to explain their decision, and not to
speakers engaged in persuading decision makers, the re-
sults may not directly apply. The following experiment
4Note that the overwhelming choice of the positive frame when ex-
tremely attractive options are involved, may reflect a ceiling effect.
was designed to eliminate specific option emphasis by us-
ing positive and negative frames that do not contrast the
two options in a way that one is focal. Further, it aimed
to generalize our findings across yet another context.
3 Experiment 2
McNeil, Pauker, Sox & Tversky (1982) studied decision-
makers’ responses to information about two alternative
treatments to lung cancer (surgery or radiation therapy).
The information was presented in either a positive (sur-
vival rates), or a negative (mortality rates) frame. Their
results showed that a large majority of decision makers
(82%) preferred surgery to radiation therapy when the
information was cast in a positive frame. This propor-
tion was reduced when the information was formulated
negatively (56%). Apparently, surgery dominated radia-
tion therapy less when the immediate consequences were
stated as an increased risk from 0% to10%, rather than as
a decreased survival rate from 100% to 90% (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1986).
These findings suggest that speakers aiming to promote
surgery would be more successful by adopting a positive
format. Although radiation therapy is not very appeal-
ing under either of the frames, speakers promoting ra-
diation therapy would still fare better by using a nega-
tive frame. As recommendation mode affects speakers’
choice of frame, speakers operating under different rec-
ommendation modes should have different success-rates
in persuading listeners.
Unlike in McNeil et al. (1982), participants in the
present experiment were placed in the speakers’ role.
They were exposed to a modified version of McNeil et
al.’s frames. Most importantly, the structure of the risky
choice frames was retained, but the context was altered.
The context dealt with the success (or failure) of business
start-ups.5 Further, slight changes were made to the spe-
cific numerical information presented in the frames in an
attempt to equalize the attractiveness of the choice op-
tions.
3.1 Method
Participants: One hundred forty-four students from
Tilburg University participated in the experiment. The
experiment was part of a set of unrelated decision-making
tasks that took about 15 minutes to complete. Participants
received C 4 for their participation.
Design and procedure: Participants were told that the
Social and Economic Council of the Netherlands (or SER
5This change was made in anticipation of the possibility that some
participants might be uncomfortable trying to persuade someone to
choose one medical treatment over another.
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Table 2: Proportions of participants in Experiment 2 preferring the positive frame as a function of recommendation
mode and the proposal being promoted.
Promoted proposal
Recommendation mode Proposal A Proposal B Total
Recommend for 31/35 (89%) 28/37 (76%) 59/72 (82%)
Recommend against 12/37 (32%) 9/35 (26%) 21/72 (29%)
Total 43/72 (60%) 37/72 (51%) 80/144 (56%)
which is the Dutch acronym) advises the government
about the outlines of social and economic policy. They
were further told that one of the many goals of the govern-
ment is stimulating economic activity, and, according to
many, the role of small and medium enterprises is thought
to be of utmost importance. Participants had to imag-
ine that the government had to choose between two al-
ternative policy proposals that were designed to increase
economic activity. Both proposals had drawbacks and
risks. There had been some experience with both policies
abroad. The consequences of both proposals could be for-
mulated in two distinct, yet logically equivalent, ways:
Formulation 1:
Under proposal A: Of 100 start-ups, 90 will
survive the first few months,
68 will survive the entire first year and 30 will
survive the first five years.
Under proposal B: Of 100 start-ups, all 100 will
survive the first few months,
77 will survive the entire first year and 25 will
survive the first five years.
Formulation 2:
Under proposal A: Of 100 start-ups, 10 will
have failed in the first few months, 32 will have
failed by the end of the first year and 70 will
have failed by the end of the first five years.
Under proposal B: Of 100 start-ups, none will
have failed in the first few months, 23 will have
failed by the end of the first year and 75 will
have failed by the end of the first five years.
Approximately half the participants were instructed to
assume that the SER had a strong preference for proposal
A. The remainder were instructed to assume that the SER
had a preference for proposal B. Participants were then
told either that the SER wanted, as strong as possible, to
recommend for the proposal, or recommend against the
alternative proposal. They were asked which formulation
the SER should select in order to be most persuasive.
The experiment thus consisted of a 2 (recommend for
vs. recommend against mode) x 2 (proposal A vs. B)
between-subjects design. The dependent variable was the
selection of frame. The order in which frames were pre-
sented on the screen was counterbalanced. No order ef-
fects were found.
3.2 Results and discussion
The results are presented in Table 2. The moderate over-
all tendency to frame positively (80 out of 144 or 56%),
was substantially enhanced when instructed to recom-
mend for a proposal (59 out of 72 or 82%), which re-
versed when participants were instructed to recommend
against the alternative proposal (21 out of 72 or 29%).
The difference was statistically reliable (exp(B) = .11, SE
= .54, p < .001). These results suggest that the findings
obtained in the previous experiment are not merely an
artifact of option emphasis. That is, our results are not
confined to frames that have an in-build emphasis on the
one option in recommend for mode and positive frames,
and an emphasis on the alternative option in recommend
against mode and negative frames. Instead, our results
extend to frames used here that lack any specific option
emphasis.
Which proposal was promoted did not reliably affect
framing behavior (exp(B) = 2.49, SE = .66, p = .16), nor
did proposal reliably interact with recommendation mode
(exp(B)= .56, SE = .84, p = .48).
Together, Experiments 1 and 2 established a clear link
between recommendation mode and valence of frame
(positive vs. negative). The results can be viewed as re-
flecting the combined effects of the positivity bias and
compatibility. Accordingly, speakers have an overall ten-
dency to frame positively. However, due to the compat-
ibility principle, this tendency is reduced and sometimes
reversed, when speakers are in recommend against mode
which is more compatible with a negative formulation. In
addition, option attractiveness affected framing behavior
of speakers, but only when the attractiveness was highly
transparent. In particular, information about inherently
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attractive options tended to be framed positively, inde-
pendent of recommendation mode. Framing was less
positive when options were inherently negative, espe-
cially when speakers were in recommend against mode.
Experiments 1 and 2 have shown that speakers’ frame
selection is dependent on recommendation mode, option
attractiveness, and possibly other factors. This depen-
dency might lead speakers astray in persuasive communi-
cation. It seems that speakers are not very sensitive to the
difference between their own perspective and that of the
potential listener. For example, when listeners are best
persuaded by the use of negative frames, speakers may
nonetheless fail to employ negative frames when in a pos-
itive recommendation mode (i.e., recommend for mode).
4 Experiment 3
There are several ways by which option attractiveness
might affect speakers’ frame selection. In the present ex-
periment, option attractiveness was examined as a possi-
ble determinant of recommendation mode, thereby indi-
rectly affecting frame selection. The adoption of recom-
mendation mode was predicted to be dependent on the
compatibility of recommendation mode valence with op-
tion valence. Specifically, relative attractive—positive—
choice options should induce most speakers to adopt a
recommend for orientation (positive valence), whereas
this tendency should be reduced, or even reversed, for
relatively unattractive—negative—choice options (i.e.,
more people would adopt a recommending against ori-
entation). In turn, a recommend for orientation would
induce more positive framing compared to a recommend
against orientation.
4.1 Method
Participants: One hundred forty-eight students from
Fontys University of Professional Education in Eind-
hoven participated in the experiment. The experiment
was part of a set of unrelated decision-making tasks that
took about 20 minutes to complete. Participants received
C 4 for their participation.
Design and procedure: Participants were exposed to
the modified version of the scenario used in Experiment
2. As in Experiment 2, participants had to imagine that
the government had to choose between two alternative
policy proposals aimed at increasing economic activity.
Approximately half the participants were told that the in-
vestment budget was larger than expected and that con-
sequently, the government had the opportunity to choose
between two very attractive alternatives. The remainder
of the participants was told that the investment budget
was smaller than expected and that, consequently, the
government had to choose between two very unattrac-
tive alternatives. Note that option attractiveness is an ab-
stract variable. Options were described as either improve-
ments (attractive), or deteriorations (unattractive) relative
to the initial situation (depending on the investment bud-
get) without being explicit about each of the options de-
tails. Specifically, participants were told the following:
Suppose that the investment budget to stimu-
late economic activity is larger [smaller] than
expected. As a consequence extra investments
can [cutbacks must] be made. The govern-
ment has to choose between two very attrac-
tive [unattractive] alternatives. The SER has
its own opinions about the two proposals and
wants to express its views to the government as
convincingly as possible. There are of course
many ways by which to accomplish this. One
of which is to choose an appropriate formula-
tion.
Participants were then asked which strategy could be
utilized most persuasively by the SER: recommending
for the proposal the SER likes most, or recommending
against the proposal the SER dislikes most (question 1).
Subsequently, on the following screen, participants
were informed about the specific choice options (i.e.,
proposals) presented in both the positive and the nega-
tive frame. Those who adopted the recommend for strat-
egy were asked which frame they would employ to rec-
ommend proposal A as convincing as possible. Those
who adopted the recommend against strategy were asked
which frame they would employ to recommend against
proposal B as convincing as possible (question 2).
In sum, the experiment comprised a one-way between-
subjects design with two conditions (attractive vs.
unattractive options). The two dependent variables were
the adoption of recommendation mode, and the subse-
quent selection of frame (positive vs. negative). The
order in which persuasive orientation and frames were
presented was counterbalanced. No order effects were
found.
4.2 Results and discussion
The results are presented in Table 3. The data were ana-
lyzed by two logistic regressions. In the first main anal-
ysis, recommendation mode was regressed on option at-
tractiveness. Overall, most participants adopted the rec-
ommend for strategy (97 out of 148, or 66%). Option
attractiveness seemed to affect recommendation mode
asymmetrically. As predicted, a large majority of par-
ticipants adopted a recommend for strategy when the op-
tions were attractive (57 out of 76, or 75%). When op-
tions were unattractive, however, more people opted for
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Table 3: Number of participants in Experiment 3 that adopt a recommend for or a recommend against orientation
(question 1), and select a positive or negative frame (question 2), as a function of option attractiveness.
Option attractiveness









Recommend for 45 12 57 34 6 40
Recommend against 5 14 19 11 21 32
Total 50 26 76 45 27 72
the recommend against strategy, and only a small major-
ity adopted a recommend for strategy (40 out of 72, or
56%). This difference was statistically reliable (exp(B) =
.42, SE = .36, p = .014).
In the second analysis, frame selection was regressed
on recommendation mode, and option attractiveness.
Consistent with the previous experiments, most partici-
pants employed a positive frame (95 out of 148, or 64%).
Due to compatibility, this tendency was most pronounced
when a recommend for strategy was adopted (79 out of
97, or 81%), and reduced when a recommend against
strategy was adopted (16 out of 51, or 31%). The differ-
ence between conditions was statistically reliable (exp(B)
= .10, SE = .61, p < .001).
As in the first part of Experiment 1, the attractiveness
of the proposals did not reliably affect frame selection
(exp(B) = .68, SE = .64, p = .55), nor did attractiveness
reliably interact with recommendation mode (exp(B) =
.971, SE = .84, p = .97).
5 Experiment 4
The previous experiments focused exclusively on the
speakers’ perspective. However, a complete pragmatic
analysis (e.g., Schwarz, 1996) entails an analysis of both
the speaker and listener perspective. The final exper-
iment, therefore, includes both perspectives simultane-
ously.
The results from Experiments 2 and 3, suggest that
speakers in different recommendation modes would prob-
ably have different success-rates in persuading listeners
to adopt one course of action over the other. The under-
lying reasoning is that different frames induce in listen-
ers (i.e., decision makers) different choices, but speakers’
frame selection, rather than depend on the specific choice
option being promoted, is dependent on recommendation
mode. In particular, McNeil et al.’s (1982) findings sug-
gest that speakers that promote policy proposal A would
be more successful when adopting a recommend for pro-
posal A (originally surgery) strategy rather than using
a recommend against proposal B (originally radiation)
strategy. In contrast, speakers that promote proposal B,
can be expected to be most successful when trying to
recommend against the alternative proposal. To directly
assess the congruency between speakers and listeners,
speakers’ choice of frame and the corresponding listen-
ers’ choice of option (i.e., proposal) were assessed within
the same experiment.
5.1 Method
Participants: One hundred forty-seven students from
Fontys University of Professional Education in Eind-
hoven participated in the experiment. The experiment
was part of a set of unrelated decision-making tasks that
took about 20 minutes to complete. Participants received
C 4 for their participation.
Design and procedure: Participants were exposed to
the scenario used in Experiment 2, except that proposal
A was made less attractive by changing the number of
business start-ups that survive [fail] in the first five years
from 30 down to 27 [70 up to 73]. This minor change
was implemented because a pilot experiment had shown
that despite previous efforts (see Experiment 2) the two
proposals were not judged to be approximately equally
attractive.
There were two speaker-conditions. Approximately
half the participants in the role of speaker were instructed
to recommend for proposal A. The remainder was asked
to recommend against proposal B. All participants were
asked which formulation the SER should use in order to
best achieve the stated goal. The order in which frames
were presented on the screen was counterbalanced. No
order effects were found.
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 4, No. 1, February 2009 Speakers’ choice of frame 60
Table 4: Participants’ responses in Experiment 4. Panel A displays the proportion of participants (in the role of
speaker) preferring the positive or negative frame to promote the proposal, as a function of recommendation mode.
Panel B displays the proportion of participants (in the role of listener) choosing proposal A or B, as a function of the
frame they were exposed to.
Panel A: Speakers
Selected frame
Recommendation mode Positive frame Negative frame Total pp’s
Recommend for 25/36 (69%) 11/36 (31%) 36
Recommend against 16/37 (42%) 21/37 (58%) 37
Total pp’s 41 32 73
Panel B: Listeners
Choice
Frame Proposal A Proposal B Total pp’s
Positive frame 25/37 (68%) 12/37 (32%) 37
Negative frame 15/37 (41%) 22/37 (59%) 37
Total pp’s 40 34 74
There were also two listener-conditions. In one condi-
tion, participants in the role of listener received informa-
tion in the positive, and in the other condition, they re-
ceived the information in the negative frame. They were
asked which proposal they would choose, if they were to
be in charge of deciding as a member of government. The
order in which proposals were presented on the screen
was counterbalanced. No order effects were found.
5.2 Results and discussion
The results are presented in Table 4. The results for
speakers and listeners are discussed in turn below.
Speakers: Across both (recommend for and against)
conditions, most participants selected the positive frame
(41 out of 73, or 56%). As expected, this tendency was
most pronounced in recommend for mode (25 out of 36,
or 69%), whereas in recommend against mode the pro-
portions of participants selecting the positive frame (16
out of 37, or 42%) was reliably reduced (z = 2.26, p =
.02). This pattern of results replicates and corroborates
the findings from Experiments 2 and 3.
Listeners: Overall, both proposals were approximately
equally attractive (choice proportions were 54% [40 out
of 74] vs. 46% [34 out of 74] respectively). As expected,
proposal A was judged most attractive when the positive
frame was employed (25 out of 37, or 68%, chose pro-
posal A), while its attractiveness in the negative frame
(15 out of 37, or 41%, chose proposal A) was reliably
reduced (z = 2.33, p = .02).
Thus, consistent with the hypothesis, speakers promot-
ing proposal A were more successful when geared to-
wards recommending for the proposal than when attempt-
ing to recommend against the alternative. It appears that
recommendation mode can have a detrimental effect on
speakers’ persuasion attempts. Ideally, speakers should
only consider the proposal they are promoting and the
impact of alternative frames on listeners, and should not
let recommendation mode lead them astray.
6 General discussion
The behavior of the decision maker, or listener, who is
exposed to different frames, has been the focal point of
many studies. In contrast, research into the use of frames
by speakers and the manner by which they choose partic-
ular frames, has been limited. The present paper exam-
ined the choice of frame by speakers whose underlying
goal is persuasion, in particular the manner by which it
interacts with Mode of recommendation.
Replicating previous results, a major finding of the
present paper is that, across different sorts of frames,
speakers who employ a recommend for strategy, tend
to use a positive frame (77% across all experiments).
The inclination to prefer positive frames, is yet another
demonstration of a more general “positivity bias.” This
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general tendency, although pervasive, is not ubiquitous.
The contribution of the present paper pertains to the
examination of the effect of recommendation mode on
speakers’ choice of frame. The preference for either of
two logically equivalent frames (positive vs. negative)
was shown to be closely related to speakers’ use of ei-
ther one of the two logically equivalent recommendation
modes. In particular, speakers’ positivity bias was atten-
uated when a recommend against strategy was adopted
(45% across all experiments), suggesting that the posi-
tivity bias in speakers’ choice of frame is asymmetrical.
These results are congruent with our other current work
(Van Buiten & Keren, 2007) in which we have shown
that speakers promoting the use of Breast Self Examina-
tion (BSE), have a general preference to employ positive
rather than negative frames. This tendency is especially
manifested when recommending for BSE, and reduced
when recommending against neglecting BSE.
Option attractiveness was shown to affect framing be-
havior directly and indirectly. When option attractive-
ness is sufficiently prominent, framing behavior is af-
fected directly. When options are very attractive, most
speakers use positive frames, in essence regardless of rec-
ommendation mode. In contrast, when options are par-
ticularly unattractive, positive frames are selected less
frequently, especially when speakers are in recommend
against mode. Moreover, option attractiveness has an in-
direct effect: for both attractive and unattractive options,
a recommend for strategy is most common, but less so
when choice options are unattractive.
Other things being equal, it is proposed that speak-
ers have a default preference for positive over negative
frames. Presumably, positive frames and evaluative pos-
itive cognitions are generally simpler and easier to com-
prehend than their negative counterparts. Moreover, so-
cial and cultural factors might contribute to the positiv-
ity bias. For better or worse, the positive formulation
of ideas, facts, and opinions serves as a social lubricant
in human communication. Positive frames simply make
“better stories” (Dawes, 1999). It seems that, in general,
the social acceptability of negative framing is low and, as
a result, carries a social cost in communication.
In addition, compatibility effects operate in different
ways to enhance or diminish the default positivity effect.
First, positive frames are associated more with recom-
mend for than with recommend against strategies. Sec-
ond, attractive options, almost by definition, are associ-
ated with positive frames, whereas unattractive options
are associated with negative frames. Third, the results
suggests that speakers, by default, adopt a recommend
for mode, but due to a compatibility between option at-
tractiveness and recommendation mode, the proportion of
speakers that adopt a recommend for rather than recom-
mend against mode is lower when options are unattrac-
tive.
Notwithstanding the previous interpretation, the de-
fault preference for positive framing and its susceptibility
to recommendation mode and option attractiveness may
also be characterized in terms of the notion of “marked-
ness.” Binary pairs (e.g., pleasant-unpleasant) typically
have two components, one that is marked (e.g., unpleas-
ant) and one that is unmarked (e.g., pleasant). Generally,
the unmarked component is used to describe the entire
dimension, is more common, less specific, and impor-
tantly, more positive than the other, marked, component.
Positive frames might correspondingly be viewed as the
unmarked member in positive-negative frame pairs. Con-
ceivably, the markedness of any binary pair (frames or
otherwise) can be influenced by the context implying that
the markedness of binary pairs is not fixed across con-
text. For example, “pleasant” might be the unmarked
component in many contexts (e.g., describing one’s ap-
praisal of leisure activities). In other contexts (e.g.„ de-
scribing one’s appraisal of obligatory activities), how-
ever, “unpleasant” seems the unmarked component. Cor-
respondingly, recommendation mode and option attrac-
tiveness constitute part of the context in speakers’ frame
construal and thus might help to explain the reduced pref-
erence for positive framing in recommend against mode
and for unattractive options.
The default adoption of recommend for mode and pos-
itive framing, and their susceptibility to compatibility ef-
fects is reminiscent of Gilbert’s characterization of belief
(Gilbert, 1991). Citing Spinoza, Gilbert argued that one
automatically believes an idea as soon as it is compre-
hended. Disbelieving is subsequent and more effortful
than the initial act of belief. Similarly, we propose that
recommend for and positive framing occur automatically
and require little effort and that one only turns to rec-
ommend against and negative framing after deliberation
when the situation calls for it.
In other realms of life, there are examples of similar
tendencies to start with a positive default which may be
revised only after subsequent reflection. For example,
when people engage in strategic behavior that involves
multiple interactions over a period of time, they can, and
often do, use a cooperative strategy referred to as “Tit for
tat.” Under this strategy, one starts with a positive orien-
tation and correspondingly an initial act of cooperation,
after which, on subsequent encounters one responds in
kind to an opponent’s cooperative (positive) action, while
an uncooperative (negative) one is answered with an un-
cooperative one. Under certain conditions, this strategy
is surprisingly effective compared to other strategies.
The conversational perspective on framing effects, ex-
plored in the present paper, illustrates two conceptions
of compatibility effect. At the higher level of commu-
nication, compatibility refers to the correspondence be-
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tween speakers and listeners. At the lower or local level,
compatibility refers to the correspondence of responses
with stimulus characteristics. At this level, compatibil-
ity effects may involve either speakers or listeners. In
the present paper the examined compatibility effects per-
tained to speakers, namely the effects of recommenda-
tion mode and option attractiveness on speakers’ choice
of frame. Local compatibility effects sway compatibil-
ity at the higher level of communication through the ef-
fects that stimulus characteristics have on the individual
responses of speakers and listeners. For example, rec-
ommendation mode affects speakers’ selection of frame,
thereby in turn influencing speakers’ persuasive impact
on listeners.
In addition to recommendation mode, option attrac-
tiveness, and evaluation mode, other factors might in-
fluence speakers’ choice of frame, and in turn the corre-
spondence between speakers and listeners. For example,
speakers might be more inclined to use negative frames
when decision makers face decisions that are not easily
reversed and are thus more sensitive to (hidden) flaws of a
product or service. An example of an important decision
that is hard to undo is the purchase of a house. Conceiv-
ably, in binary choice, speakers would be more willing to
express information in terms of relative disadvantages of
the non-preferred alternative (e.g., House NP is located in
a worse neighborhood than house P) than in terms of rel-
ative advantages of the preferred alternative (e.g., House
P is located in a better neighborhood than House NP).
A basic maxim underlying the studies reported here
concerns what has been termed by Grice the “coopera-
tive principle.” Following this principle, the conversa-
tional discourse takes place under the mutual assumption
(of both speaker and listener) that the speaker attempts
to formulate his message in the most clear and compre-
hensive manner (given the situation and the listener to
whom the message is addressed). Implicit in this maxim
is the further assumption that the speaker is honest, even
if the speaker’s interests are not necessarily identical with
those of the listener. In other words, in the terminology
of game theory, the communication between speaker and
listener resembles a coordination game in which there
is a mutual interest to promote cooperation. What hap-
pens if the cooperative principle is not satisfied? How
does framing change strategically under circumstances in
which speaker and listener do not share the same inter-
ests or, worse, have opposing interests? Would the role
of recommendation mode and the relative frequency pos-
itive and negative framing change? Though these ques-
tions are beyond the scope of the present paper, they are
worthy of future research if one wants to have a more
comprehensive understanding of framing and its role in
communication.
References
Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981). The evolution of
cooperation. Science, 211, 1390–1396.
Battistella, E. L. (1996). The logic of markedness. NY,
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bonaccio, S., & Dalal, R. S. (2006). Advice taking and
decision-making: An integrative literature review, and
implications for the organizational sciences. Organiza-
tional Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 101,
127–151.
Crowley, A. E., & Hoyer W. D. (1994) An integra-
tive framework for understanding two-sided persua-
sion. Journal of Consumer research, 20, 561–574.
Dawes, R. M. (1999). A message from psychologists to
economists: Mere predictability doesn’t matter like it
should (without a good story appended to it). Journal
of Economic Behavior and Organization, 39, 29–40.
Druckman, J. N. (2001). The implications of framing ef-
fects for citizen competence. Political Behavior, 23,
225–256.
Fraenkel, T., & Schul, Y. (2007). The meaning of negated
adjectives. Unpublished manuscript, Department of
Psychology, The Hebrew University.
Ganzach, Y. (1995). Attribute scatter and decision out-
come: Judgment versus choice. Organizational Be-
havior and Human Decision Processes, 62, 113–122.
Gilbert, D. T. (1991). How mental systems believe.
American Psychologist, 46, 107–119.
Grice, H. P. (1975). Logic and conversation. In P. C. Cole
& J. L. Morgan (Eds.), Syntax and semantics 3: Speech
acts (pp. 41–58). New York: Academic press.
Heller, D., Levin, I. P., & Goransson, M. (2002). Se-
lection of strategies for narrowing choice options: An-
tecedents and consequences. Organizational Behavior
and Human Decision Processes, 89, 1194–1213.
Hsee, C. K., Loewenstein, G. F., Blount, S., & Bazerman,
M. H. (1999). Preference reversals between joint and
separate evaluations of options: a review and theoreti-
cal analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 125, 576–590.
Levin, I. P., Schneider, S. L., & Gaeth, G. J. (1998). All
frames are not created equal: A typology and critical
analysis of framing effects. Organizational Behavior
and Human Decision Processes, 76, 149–188.
McKenzie, C. R. M., & Nelson, J. D. (2003). What a
speaker’s choice of frame reveals: Reference points,
frame selection, and framing effects. Psychonomic
Bulletin and Review, 10, 596–602.
McNeil, B. J., Pauker, S. G., Sox, H. C., Jr., & Tversky,
A. (1982). On the elicitation of preferences for alterna-
tive therapies. New England Journal of Medicine, 306,
1259–1262.
Meloy, M. G., & Russo, J. E. (2004). Binary choice under
instructions to select versus reject. Organizational Be-
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 4, No. 1, February 2009 Speakers’ choice of frame 63
havior and Human Decision Processes, 93, 114–128.
Payne, J. W., Bettman, J. R., & Johnson, E. J. (1993).
The adaptive decision maker. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Peeters, G., & Czapinski, J. (1990). Positive-negative
asymmetry in evaluations: The distinction between af-
fective and informational negativity effects. European
Review of Social Psychology, 1, 33–60.
Sally, D. (2002). ’What an ugly baby!’ Risk dominance,
sympathy, and the coordination of meaning. Rational-
ity and Society, 14, 78–108.
Schwarz, N. (1996). Cognition and communication:
Judgmental biases, research methods, and the logic of
conversation. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Shafir, E. (1995). Compatibility in cognition and deci-
sion. In J. R. Busemeyer, R. Hastie, & D. L. Medin
(Eds.), Decision making from the perspective of cogni-
tive psychology (The psychology of learning and moti-
vation, Vol. 32) (pp. 247–274). New York: Academic
Press.
Shafir, E. (1993). Choosing versus rejecting: Why some
options are both better and worse than others. Memory
and Cognition, 21, 546–556.
Sher, S., & McKenzie, C. R. M. (2006). Information
leakage from logically equivalent frames. Cognition,
101, 467–494.
Soman, D. (2004). Framing, loss aversion, and mental ac-
counting. In D. J. Koehler & N. Harvey (Eds.), Black-
well Handbook of Judgment and Decision Making (pp.
379–398). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
Teigen, K. H., & Brun, W. (1999). The directionality of
verbal probability expressions: Effects on decisions,
predictions, and probabilistic reasoning. Organiza-
tional Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 80,
155–190.
Teigen, K. H., Halberg, A.-M., & Fostervold, K. I.
(2007). Single-limit interval estimates as reference
points. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 21, 383–406.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981). The framing of
decisions and the psychology of choice. Science, 211,
453–458.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1986). Rational choice
and the framing of decisions. Journal of Business, 59,
S251-S278.
Van Buiten, M., & Keren, G. (2007). The impact of
message framing on breast self-examination: A re-
Examination. Unpublished manuscript, Eindhoven
University of Technology.
Van Buiten, M., & Keren, G. (2009). Speaker-listener
incompatibility: joint and separate processing in risky
choice framing. Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes, 108, 106–115.
Wedell, D. H. (1997). Another look at reasons for choos-
ing and rejecting. Memory and Cognition, 25, 873–
887.
Wilson, D., & Sperber, D. (2004). Relevance theory. In
G. Ward & L. Horn (Eds.), Handbook of Pragmatics
(pp. 607–632). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
Yaniv, I., Schul, Y., Raphaelli-Hirsch, R., & Maoz, I.
(2002). Inclusive and exclusive modes of thinking:
Studies of prediction, preference and social perception
during parliamentary elections. Journal of Experimen-
tal Social Psychology, 38, 352-367.
